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Abstract
Reinikka and Svensson demonstrate  that, with  these  surveys permit measurement of corruption  at the
appropriate  survey methods  and interview  techniques,  it  level  of individual agents,  such as schools, health clinics,
is possible to collect quantitative  micro-level data on  or firms.  They also permit the study of mechanisms
corruption.  Public expenditure tracking surveys,  service  responsible for corruption, including  leakage of funds
provider surveys,  and enterprise surveys  are highlighted  and bribery, as data on corruption can be combined with
with several applications.  While often broader  in scope,  other data collected  in these surveys.
This paper-a product of Public Services, Development Research  Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to measure
and explain corruption  at micro level and to explore  its effects on service delivery. Copies of the paper are available free
from the World  Bank,  1818  H Street NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact Hedy Sladovich,  room  MC3-607,
telephone 202-473-7698, fax 202-522-1154, email address hsladovich@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers
are also posted on the Web at http:H/econ.worldbank.org.  The authors may  be contacted at rreinikka@worldbank.org  or
jsvensson@worldbank.org.  June 2003.  (16 pages)
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suggestions.1.  Introduction
The past decade has witnessed a boom in the empirical economic  literature on
corruption. With few exemptions, the existing literature has three common features.'  First,
it is based on cross-country analyses.2 Second, the literature exploits data on corruption
derived from perception indices.  Finally, it explains corruption as a function of countries'
policy and institutional environment. Although the literature has provided important
insights on the aggregate determinants of corruption, it has drawbacks.  In particular,
perception indices raise concerns about biases. Also, the aggregate nature of the data tells
us little about the relationship between corruption and individual  agents, such as firms or
service providers. Conceptually macro-level determinants cannot satisfactorily explain the
within-country variation of corruption; firms and service providers facing similar
institutions and policies may still end up paying or demanding different amounts in bribes.
The quantitative measurement of corruption is difficult, but not impossible. We
show this using three different data collection approaches: public expenditure tracking
surveys, service provider surveys, and firm surveys. Although each approach has a more
general  focus, corruption-broadly  defined-is often identified as a key issue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the key features
and findings of the expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) in education and health care
where the focus is on leakage of public funds. Section 3 looks at the experience with
provider surveys to explore incentives  and performance problems, such as absenteeism, on
the frontline. Section 4 presents the fnmn-level approach and discusses key findings on the
incidence, level, and effects of corruption on enterprise performance.  Section 5 concludes
with a discussion on policy implications.
2.  Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys  (PETS)
Government resources allocated for particular uses flow within a legally defined
institutional framework.  Funds often pass through several layers of government
bureaucracy on the way to service facilities, which are charged with the responsibility of
exercising the spending. Policymakers in developing countries seldom have information on
actual  public spending at the provider or facility level or by activity. A public expenditure
tracking survey (PETS) tracks the flow of resources through these strata, on a sample
survey basis, in order to determine how much of the originally allocated resources reach
each level. It is therefore useful as a method for locating and quantifying political and
bureaucratic  capture, leakage of funds, and problems in the deployment of human and in-
1. See  Svensson (2003a).
2. Recent contributions on the determninants of corruption include Ades and di Tella (1997,  1999),
Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003), Svensson (2000a), and Treisman (2000). On the effects of corruption,
see Mauro (1995), Wei (1997), and Johnson and others (1997).
Ikind resources, such as staff, textbooks, and drugs. A typical PETS of frontline providers
(schools and clinics and their staff) and local governments  (politicians and public officials)
is complemented by central  government financial data.
The PETS explicitly recognizes that an agent may have a strong incentive to
misreport.  These incentives derive from the fact that information provided, for example, by
a school or a health facility partly determines its entitlement to public support. In cases
where resources,  including staff time, are used for corruption or shirking, the agent
involved in the activity will most likely not report it truthfully. Likewise official charges
may only partly capture what the survey intends to measure (such as the user's cost of
service). The PETS deals with these data issues by (i) using a multiangular data collection
strategy (a combination of information from different sources); and (ii) carefully
considering which sources and respondents have incentives to misreport, and identifying
data sources that are the least contaminated by such incentives.  This data collection
strategy serves to cross-validate the information  obtained separately from each source.
The PETS allows us to observe the outputs and actions of service providers, and
thereby provide new information to policymakers  and beneficiaries  on the complex
transformation of public budgets to services.  When tailored to the specific circumstances,
these tools can help identify incentives and shed light on the interactions  which these
incentives give rise to, such as collusion and bribery.  They can also illuminate the political
economy, such as the effect of interest groups on spending outcomes. The novelty of the
PETS approach lies not so much in the development of new methods of analysis per se, but
the application proven methods (micro surveys) to service providers  and governments.
2.1  Using PETS to Measure Corruption
Uganda was the first country to do a PETS in 1996. The study was motivated by
the observation that despite a substantial increase in public spending on education, the
official reports showed no increase in primary enrollment.  The hypothesis was that actual
service delivery,  proxied by primary enrollment,  was worse than budgetary allocations
implied because public funds were subject to capture (by local politicians and public
officials) and did not reach the intended facilities (schools).  To test this hypothesis, a PETS
was conducted to compare budget allocations to actual  spending through various tiers of
government,  including  frontline service delivery points, which in this involved primary
schools (Ablo and Reinikka  1998; Reinikka 2001).
Adequate public accounts on actual spending were not available,  so the survey
collected  five years of data on spending  (including in-kind transfers),  service outputs, and
provider characteristics in 250 government primary schools. The initial objective of the
PETS was purely diagnostic, that is, to measure leakage in school funding. As sections 2.2
2and 2.3 show, a PETS can also provide quantitative data on and explain leakage of public
funds, as well as serve as a tool for impact evaluation.
The first Ugandan school survey provides a stark picture of public funding on the
frontlines. On average,  only 13  percent of the annual capitation grant (per student) from the
central government reached the school in 1991-95 (Table  1). Eighty-seven percent either
disappeared for private gain or was captured by district officials for purposes unrelated to
education, although there was no evidence of increased spending in other sectors (Jeppson
2001). Most schools received very little or nothing. Based on yearly data, 73  percent of the
schools received less than 5 percent, while only 10 percent received more than 50 percent
of the intended funds. The picture looks slightly better when constraining  the sample to the
last year of the survey period. Still, only 22 percent of the total capitation grant from the
central government reached the schools in 1995  (Reinikka and Svensson 2002a).
Table 1. Leakage of Nonwage  Funds in Primary Education in Uganda,  1991-95 and 2001
(percent)
Year  Mean  Median
1991  97  100
1992  96  100
1993  85  100
1994  84  100
1995  78  100
2001  18  18
Source: Reinikka (2001); Reinikka  and Svensson (2003).
Subsequently, several other countries implemented public expenditure tracking
surveys in education and health care.  In primary education, these studies include Ghana,
Peru, Tanzania,  and Zambia. Leakage of nonwage funddefined as the share of resources
intended for but not received  by the frontline service facility-is found to be a major issue
in all cases (Table 2).




Ghana 2000  50
Peru 2002*  30
Tanzania  1999  57
Zambia 2002  60
* Utilities only.
Source: Ye and Canagarajah (2002) for Ghana; Instituto Apoyo and World Bank (2002) for Peru; Price
Waterhouse Coopers (1999) for Tanzania; Das and others (2002) for Zambia.
3According to the PETS in Zambia-unlike  in Uganda  in the mid-1 990s-rule-
based allocations seemed to reach the intended beneficiaries:  more than 90 percent of all
schools received their rule-based nonwage allocations,  and 95 percent of teachers received
their salaries (Das and others 2002). But rule-based  funding accounts only for 30 percent
of all funding. In discretionary allocations  (70 percent of the total spending) the positive
results no longer hold:  less than 20 percent of schools receive any funding from
discretionary sources. The rest is spent at the provincial and district level. Similarly, in the
case of overtime allowances (which must be filed every term) or other discretionary
allowances,  50 percent were overdue by six months or more.
A few studies also quantify the share of ghosts on the payroll, that is, teachers or
health workers who continue to receive a salary but who no longer are in government
service, or who have been included in the payroll without ever being in service.  In
Honduras, for example, 5 percent of teachers on the payroll were found to be ghosts, while
in health care the percentage was 8.3 for general practitioners in 2000 (World Bank 2001).
In Africa, the comparable  figures are higher: 20 percent in Uganda in 1993  (Table  3).
Table 3. Ghost Workers on Payroll
(percent)
Ghosts workers
Country  Education  Health
Honduras 2000  5.0  8.3
Uganda 1993  20.0
- Not available.
Source: World Bank (2001) for Honduras; Reinikka (2001) for Uganda.
Taken together, the PETS carried out in Africa found leakage of nonwage funds on
a very large scale. Salaries and allowances also suffer from leakage but to a much lesser
extent.  Given that availability of books and other instructional materials are key to
improving the quality of schooling, the fact that between  87 percent (Uganda) and 50
percent (Ghana) of the funding for these inputs never reach the schools makes leakage a
major policy concern in the education sector.  Instead of instituting more general public
sector reforms, the PETS in Uganda shows that it may be more efficient to target reformns
and interventions at specific problem spots. For example, the PETS in 1996 pointed to the
fact that nonwage expenditures are much more prone to leakage than salary expenditures.
They also demonstrate that leakage occurs at specific tiers within the government
(typically  at the local governments  in Tanzania,  Uganda, and Zambia).  This knowledge can
be exploited to implement more focused and hence more efficient interventions.
42.2 Explaining  Capture of  Public Funds
A striking feature of the Uganda (PETS) data is that although a majority of schools
did not receive funding (in a given year), there was still large variation in leakage across
schools. Reinikka and Svensson (2002a) develop a simple bargaining model to explain this
variation.  In the model, resource flows-and leakage-are  endogenous to school
characteristics,  as schools use their bargaining power vis-a-vis other parts of the
government to secure greater shares of the funding.  Specifically,  in the absence of central
govermment oversight, local government officials and schools bargain over nonwage
expenditures disbursed by the central government to local governments (districts). The
district is supposed to pass the grant on to schools.  Since district officials have discretion
over these funds, only they know the amount of monthly trarnsfers  (which varies frequently
given cash budgeting).  In principle, a school could obtain information on disbursements of
the capitation  grant, but in practice contacting the central government is costly.
Even if the school decides to pay for obtaining the necessary  information,
exercising their voice (see Hirschman  1970) is also costly. It would require organizing the
parents and teachers and lodging a complaint with higher authorities. The key implication
of the model is that resources are not allocated according to the rules underlying the
government's budget decisions, with obvious equity and efficiency implications.
As shown in Reinikka and Svensson (2002a), the model's predictions  are
confirmed in the data obtained from PETS. Specifically,  larger schools appear to receive a
larger share of the intended  funds (per student). Schools with children of better-off parents
also experience  a lower degree of leakage, while schools with a higher share of unqualified
teachers experience a higher leakage. After addressing potential  selection, endogeneity,
and measurement  issues, these school characteristics  have a quantitatively large impact on
the degree of leakage.  A  1-percent increase in school size (evaluated  at the mean of all
explanatory variables) reduces leakage by 2 percentage points. A 1-percent increase in
household income (proxied by PTA fees) increases the amount of public funding that
reaches the school by 0.25 percentage points, and a similar increase in the share of
qualified teachers  reduces leakage  by 0.27 percentage points.
These findings provide new insights into an area almost exclusively  studied using
cross-country data. They show that a large part of the variation in corruption at the local
level can be explained  by studying the interaction between local officials and end-users
(schools  in this case) as a bargaining game. From an analytical point of view, this approach
differs from much of the existing literature on corruption,  since it focuses on the
principal's (the school's) rather than the agent's (the district official's) incentives  and
constraints.
52.3. Evaluating  Impact of a Public  Information Campaign
Following publication of the first PETS findings in 1996, the Ugandan central
government made a swift attempt to remedy the situation.  It began publishing the monthly
intergovernmental  transfers of public funds in the main newspapers, broadcasting
information on them on radio, and requiring prinmary schools to post information on
inflows of funds for all to see. This not only made information available to parent-teacher
associations (PTA), but also signaled local governments that the center had resumed its
oversight function.  An evaluation of the information campaign-using a repeat
PETS-reveals  great improvement.  While schools on average are still not receiving the
entire grant (and there are delays) capture has been reduced from on average 78 percent in
1995  to 18 percent in 2001  (Table 1).
A before-after comparison for the same schools in 1995 and 2001-and controlling
for a broad range of school-specific  factors,  such as household income, teacher education,
school size, and degree of supervision-suggests  that the information campaign can
explain two-thirds of this massive improvement (Reinikka and Svensson 2003). This is
likely to be an upper bound on the effect, since it cannot distinguish the effect of the
information campaign from other policy actions or changes that simultaneously influenced
all schools' ability to claim their entitlement.
A key component in the information campaign was making monthly transfers of
public funds to the districts public in newspapers.  Thus, schools with access to newspapers
have been more extensively exposed to the information campaign.  Interestingly, in 1995,
schools with and without access to newspapers suffered just as much from local capture.
From  1995 to 2001, both groups experienced a large drop in leakage, which is consistent
with the before-after findings. However, the reduction in capture is significantly higher for
the schools with newspapers;  these schools on average increased their funding by 10
percentage points more than the schools that lacked newspapers. The results hold also
when controlling for differences  in income,  school size, staff qualifications,  and the
incidence of supervision across the two groups.
With a relatively inexpensive policy action-provision of mass
information-Uganda has dramatically reduced capture of a public program to increase
primary education. Poor schools, being less able to claim their entitlement from the district
officials before the campaign, benefited most from the information campaign.
3.  Frontline Provider Surveys
Service provider surveys are increasingly  used to examine the efficiency of public
spending, incentives  and various dimensions of service delivery in provider organizations,
especially on the frontline. The quantitative  service delivery survey (QSDS) is a variant of
these provider surveys, with a heavy emphasis on systematic quantitative  data. It can be
6applied to government, private for-profit, and not-for-profit providers. It collects data on
inputs, outputs, quality, pricing, oversight, and so forth. The facility or frontline service
provider is typically the main unit of observation in a QSDS in much the sarne way as the
firm is in enterprise surveys  and the household  is in household surveys. A QSDS requires
considerable effort, cost, and time compared to some of its alternatives,  especially
surveying perceptions.
A QSDS-type survey conducted in Bangladesh made unannounced  visits to health
clinics with the intention of discovering what fraction of medical professionals were
present at their assigned post (Chaudhury and Hammer 2003). The survey quantified the
extent of this problem on a nationally representative  scale and collected other information
as well. Absentee  rates for medical providers in general  are quite high (35 percent),  and
higher for doctors (40 percent; and 74 percent at lower-level  health facilities).3
Determinants of staff absenteeism include whether the medical provider lives near the
health facility, has access to a road, or has an electricity connection.4-
Table 4. Absence  Rates among Teachers and Health-Care Workers in the Public Sector
(percent)
Country  Primary  schools  Primary  health facilities
Bangladesh 2002  - 35
Honduras  2000  14  27
India* 2002  23  43
Peru 2002  13  26
Uganda 2002  26  35
Zambia 2002  17
- Not available.
* Average  for 14  States.
Source: Chaudhury and Hammer (2003) for Bangladesh; Chaudhury  and others (2003) for India, Peru, and
Uganda; World Bank (2001) for Honduras;  Habyarimana and others (2003)  for Zambia.
Honduras used a combination of PETS and QSDS to diagnose moral hazard with
respect to frontline health and education staff (World Bank 2001).  The study demonstrated
that even when salaries and nonwage funds reach frontline providers certain staff behaviors
and incentives in public service have an adverse effect on service delivery, particularly
absenteeism and job capture by employees.  Migration of posts (due to capture  by
employees)  was considered a major problem. The Honduran system of staffing assigns
posts to the central ministry,  not individual facilities. Because the central ministry has
discretion over the geographic  distribution of posts, frontline staff have an incentive to
lobby for having their posts transferred to more attractive locations,  most often to urban
3.  These rates do not separate excused and unexcused absences, but compare the staff roster to those
who were physically present at the time of the survey.
4. The average absence  rate is the same in Ugandan health facilities,  but even higher (43  percent) in
India (Table 4). In schools absence rates are generally  lower (35 percent).
7areas. The implication is that posts migrate  from the rural and primary level to cities and
higher levels of health care/schooling.  This is neither efficient nor equitable.
The PETS/QSDS set out to quantify the incongruity between budgetary and real
staff assignments  and determine the degree of attendance at work. It used central
government  information sources and a nationally representative  sample of frontline
facilities  in health and education.  Central government payroll data indicated each
employee's place of work. The unit of observation was both the facility and the staff
member,  both operational and administrative,  and included all levels of the two sectors
from the ministry down to the service facility level.
In health, the study found absenteeism to be generic, with an average attendance
rate of 73 percent across all staff categories  (Table 4). Thirty-nine percent of absences
were without justifiable reason (such as sick leave, vacations, and compensation for extra
hours worked).  This amounts to 1O percent of total staff work time. Multiple jobs were
prevalent,  especially for general practitioners and specialists.  Fifty-four percent of
specialist physicians had two or more jobs, and 60 percent of these were in a related field.
Five percent of sampled staff members had migrated to posts other than the one assigned to
them in the central database, while 40 percent had moved since their first assignment. The
highest proportions of migrators were found among general practitioners. Migration was
always from lower- to higher-level institutions, although there was also some lateral
migration. Job migration was found to reflect a combination of employee capture and
budget inflexibility.
In education, staff migration was highest among nonteaching  staff and secondary
teachers.  Multiple jobs in education were twice as prevalent as in health, with 23 percent of
all teachers doing two or more jobs. Finally, 40 percent of workers in the education sector
worked in administrative jobs suggesting, perhaps,  a preference  for nonfrontline  service
employment, or perhaps deliberate employment creation on the part of the government.
The QSDS is still a new tool but the results of the first surveys are encouraging.
There  are ongoing attempts-for which published results are not yet available-to use the
QSDS to measure other aspects of corruption and inefficiencies across service providers,
including drug leakage, wastage,  and informal user fees.
4.  Measuring and Understanding Corruption at the Firm-Level
Can reliable micro data on corruption really be collected from firms? Given the
secretive nature of corrupt activities, the common view has been that it is virtually
impossible to collect reliable quantitative information  on corruption. Kaufmann (1997)
argues that this presumption is incorrect. With appropriate survey methods and interview
techniques, rmanagers are willing to discuss corruption with remarkable candor. At the
same time, in order to collect reliable information on graft at the firm level, it is crucial to
8design an empirical  strategy that gives the manager an incentive to cooperate and truthfully
report their experiences  with corruption.
One such attempt was carried out in the late  1990s in Uganda. A "standard"  firm-
level survey tool was used to collect quantitative information on bribe payments across
firms (Reinikka and Svensson 2001). The idea was to combine detailed financial and
structural information from the firms with the quantitative graft data, yielding a unique
data set to study the determinants  and consequences  of corruption at the firm level.5
The empirical  strategy to collect information on bribe payments  across firms in
Uganda had the following four key components.  First, a local industry association, Uganda
Manufactures'Association  Consultancy and Information  Service, implemented the survey.
In Uganda,  as in many other countries,  there is a deep-rooted distrust of the public sector.
To avoid suspicion of the overall objective of the data collection effort, it was therefore
decided that a body in which most firms had confidence  should implement the survey.
Second, the questions on corruption were phrased in an indirect manner to avoid
implicating the respondent of wrongdoing.  Third, the corruption-related  questions were
asked at the end of the interview, when the enumerator had had enough time to establish
the necessary credibility and trust. Finally, to enhance  the reliability of the corruption data,
multiple questions were asked on corruption in different sections of the questionnaire.
Consistent findings across measures significantly increase the reliability of the data.6 The
data collection effort was also aided by the fact that corruption had, to a large extent,  been
desensitized in Uganda. Prior to the survey, several awareness-raising campaigns had been
implemented on the consequences of corruption.7
A striking finding of the survey was the large variation in reported graft across
firms (Svensson 2003a).  Since the Uganda firm-level survey was designed to be
representative  of the population of firms, why would some firms need to pay bribes while
others do not? Clearly, there might be several reasons. For instance, firms deal with public
officials who differ on the personal  (moral) cost of demanding bribes. Public officials'
perception of the likelihood of getting caught if being corrupt and the perceived
punishment if found guilty may also differ. However, the most likely explanation is that
5.  Kaufinann  and Wei (1999)  use firm-level  data (based on the Global Competitiveness Report index)
to assess the validation  of the "grease argument,"  but the data is  perception-based and derived from questions
referring  to country characteristics.  Ades and di Tella (1999) utilize the same source but use country
averages.  Hellman and others (2000a,b) also use micro (firmn-level)  data.  The data from 20 countries is
numerical but ordinal (based on multicategory responses  to questions.on corruption). In line with (and
complementary  to) the cross-country  literature, they explain corruption as a function of the political-
institutional environment (property rights protection  and civil liberties).
6. The firm survey had a more general focus. The survey data have been used to evaluate  the effects of
trade liberalization  on firm productivity (Gauthier 2001), assess the bad news principle (Svensson 2000b),
and study the effects  of, and coping with, poor public service provision (Reinikka and Svensson 2002b).
Reinikka and Collier (2001) summarize several of the findings from the firm survey.
7.  See Ruzindana and others (1998)  and World Bank (1998).
9officials'  opportunity to extract bribes, that is, their opportunity to influence the firms'
business decisions and cash flows, differ across sectors and locations. With private firms,
these control rights stem from the existing regulatory system and the discretion public
officials have over implementing, executing,  and enforcing  rules and benefits that affect
firms, such as business regulations, licensing requirements, permissions, taxes,
exemptions,  and public-goods provision.
How much must graft-paying firms then pay? As discussed in Svensson (2003a), if
the firms face the same set of rules and regulations  and there are no differences  in the
number (or the extent) of interactions with the public sector,  the answer must be firm
specific.  Consider a firm forced to pay bribes to continue its operations and that is
bargaining with a rent-maximizing public official.  The official will try to extort as high a
bribe as possible, subject to the constraints that she might get caught and punished and that
the firm might exit. Two firm-specific  features would influence the magnitude of the graft
demand according to this bargaining hypothesis:  the firm's ability to pay the bribe and the
firm's refusal power, that is, the cost of not paying.
In line with the control right hypothesis, the survey data reveal that there are
statistical differences between the group of firms that pay graft and the group of firms that
don't. Firms that don't pay graft tend to have characteristics  suggesting that they operate in
sectors with little or no contact with the public sector, that is, in the informal sector.  They
receive significantly less public services, are less involved in foreign trade, and pay fewer
types of taxes, particularly when controlling for tax exemptions.  This interpretation is
further supported by the finding that firms reporting positive bribe payments spend
significantly more time dealing with government regulations and more money on
accountants and specialized service providers to deal with regulations and taxes. In other
respects, the two groups of firms are similar.
Consistent with the bargaining hypothesis, Svensson (2003a) finds that firms'
"ability to pay," proxied by firms' current and expected future profitability,  and firms'
"ability to refuse to pay," proxied by the expected cost of reallocation,  can explain a large
part of the variation in bribes across graft-reporting firms. The results are statistically
robust and remained  intact when instrumenting for profits. These results suggest that
public officials act as price (bribe) discriminators, demanding higher bribes (for a given
public service) from firms that can afford to pay, and demanding lower bribes from those
that can credibly threaten to exit the market or use other means of acquiring the service.
Do bribe payments constitute a heavy burden on firms? The evidence suggests that
they do. For the firms reporting positive bribes, the average  amount of corrupt payments
was equivalent to US$ 8,280,  with a median payment of US$  1,820.  These are large
amounts, on average corresponding to US$ 88 per worker, or roughly 8 percent of the total
costs (1 percent in the mean). Including firms reporting zero bribe payments, the average
payment is US$ 6,730, with a median payment of US$ 450.
10Approximately  50 percent of the firms reporting positive bribe payments paid more
in grafts (annually) than for security (including guards and investment in security-related
equipment).  Almost 50 percent of the firms reported larger bribe payments than total
investment.8
When assessing these data, it should be stressed that despite the data collection
strategy,  there are likely to be cases of misreporting in the sample.  The average  graft
numbers may be sensitive to such misreporting.  The strategy used  to collect information  on
graft, however, has minimized any obvious systematic biases in the correlation between
reported graft and the set of explanatory variables  discussed above.
Fisman and Svensson (2000) use the same firm-level  data set to study the effects of
corruption on firm performance.  Evaluating the effects of corruption (for instance on firm
growth) using firm-level  data is difficult. The problem is identification,  since both growth
and corruption are likely to be jointly determined.  A simple example illustrates the point.
Consider two firms in a given sector of similar size and age. One of the firms is producing
a good/brand perceived to have a very favorable demand forecast,  while the other firm is
producing a good with much less favorable  demand growth.  Assume furthermore that the
firms need to clear a certain number of business regulations and licensing requirements, or
require some public infrastructure  services.  Moreover,  assume that public servants have
discretion in implementing and enforcing these regulations and services. A rational rent-
extracting public official would try to extract as high a bribe as possible. In this setup,  one
would expect a public official to demand higher bribes from the firm producing the good
with a favorable demand forecast, simply because this firm's expected profits are higher
and, thus, its ability to pay is larger. If the forecasts also influence the firms'  willingness to
invest and expand, we would expect (comparing these two firms) a positive (observed)
relationship between corruption and growth.
Fisman and Svensson (2001)  try to overcome  this simultaneity  problem by using
industry-location averages  as instruments.  They argue that if the simultaneity problem is
specific for firms, but not industries or locations,  then netting out this firm-specific
component yields a bribe measure that only depends on the underlying characteristics
inherent to particular industries and/or locations.
Fisman and Svensson (2001) find the rate of bribery to be negatively correlated
with firm growth.  For the full data set, a 1 percentage point increase in the bribery rate is
associated with a reduction in firm growth of 3 percentage points, an effect about three
times greater than that of taxation on firm growth.  Moreover, after outliers  have been
excluded, they find a much greater negative impact of bribery on growth,  while the effect
of taxation is considerably reduced.
8. Part of the explanation to this striking finding is that a considerable number of firms invested very
little or nothing in any given year.Despite these strong results, it should once more be stressed that in reality, some
firms may still benefit (and possibly a great deal) from corruption. What this type of
econometric work identifies is what is true on average,  or in general.  The data suggest that
there is a strong negative relationship between bribery payments and firm growth on
average.
In the firm survey work discussed above,  the graft data measure the aggregate  (for
an individual  firm) graft paid by firms. A complementary  approach is to indirectly estimate
subcomponents of this firm-specific  aggregate, using cost information on provision of
homogeneous public services (goods).  In the Uganda firm-survey, information on two
variables related to the delivery of public services was collected (Svensson 2001, Reinikka
and Svensson 2001). The respondents were asked about the total costs (including informal
payments to speed up the process) of getting connected to the public grid and the total cost
(including informal payments to speed up the process) of acquiring a telephone line. The
fee for a telephone connection (around US$ 100) was supposed to be fixed. Thus,
deviations from the set price typically reflect graft. Connection costs to the public
electricity grid is more problematic. In fact, the cost of connection to the public grid is a
complex function of load requirements, necessary  upgrades,  and distance to existing
voltage connection.  The complexity in determining the price of connection  implies that the
public electricity company in reality had large discretion over the cost. To the extent that
the other determinants of connection costs to the public grid can be controlled for,
deviations typically reflect graft.
Most fimns acquiring a telephone  line had to pay more than the official (set) price
(Svensson 2003b). On average, the additional cost was around US$ 130 which, given that
the official price was around US$  100, implies that the average firm had to pay more than
twice the stated cost to acquire a telephone  line. The results are similar when analyzing the
cost of connecting to the public grid. Interestingly, there is no clear relationship between
the excess price and the time it takes for firms to get access to the services they paid for
(Svensson 2003b).
A similar approach to collect quantitative  data on corruption is used in di Tella and
Schargrodsky  (2003). They collect procurement data (prices paid) on basic, homogeneous
inputs for public hospitals in Buenos Aires, Argentina. During a crackdown on corruption
in public hospitals, they find that these prices fell by 15 percent.
5.  Conclusion
The paper has argued that with appropriate  survey methods and interview
techniques,  it is possible to collect quantitative  data on corruption at the micro level. In
particular, the public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) and related quantitative  service
delivery  surveys (QSDS)  are promising new microeconomic tools for diagnosing
corruption and other problems in basic service provision in developing countries (see
12Dehn, Reinikka, and Svensson 2003  for a discussion). Until recently, the analysis of
service delivery has focused almost entirely on financing services, while provision,
particularly issues related to institutions, incentives, and provider behavior,  has received
much less attention.  The PETS and QSDS address  this omission.
From a policy perspective it should be noted that the extent (or variation across
firms and service providers) of corruption  and capture seem to have less to do with
conventional audit and supervision mechanisms,  and more to do with the schools'  or
clinics' opportunity to voice their claims for the funds, and firms' bargaining positions.
Traditionally,  it has been left to the government and a country's legal institutions to devise
and enforce public accountability.  The findings reviewed in this paper question this one-
sided approach.  As the government's role and services have expanded  considerably during
the past decades, it has become apparent that conventional mechanisms,  such as audit and
legislative reviews, may not be enough. Collusion,  organizational deficiencies,  abuse, and
lack of responsiveness  to citizens' needs cannot easily be detected and rectified even with
the best of supervision.  When the institutions are weak, as is common in many developing
countries,  the government's potential role as auditor and supervisor is even more
constrained.
The positive impact of the information campaign  to reduce capture  in Uganda
further suggests that corruption can be effectively tackled only when the reform of the
political process and the restructuring of the regulatory systems are complemented by a
systematic effort to increase the citizens'  ability to monitor and challenge  abuses of the
system, and inform the citizens about their rights and entitlements.9 Breaking the culture of
secrecy that pervades  the functioning of the government and empowering people to
demand public accountability are two important components  in such an effort.
Recent reviews of growth performance in Sub-Saharan Africa have identified a
number of recurring features of African politics likely to undermine the results of
traditional institutional reforms. These features include restricted civil society involvement,
the state perceived  as a vehicle of wealth accumulation,  the prevalence of patronage
politics, and a small elite with close political connections.  Although each feature  may not
be applicable to every country,  a successful national anticorruption  program must also
tackle these fundamental determinants of corruption.
9. Paul (1997) makes  the same argument.
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